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I. INTRODUCTION
The role of taxation in the process of wage formation has reeently
gained interest in the macroeconomie literature. Attention has been
drawn on the tax push inflation argument, e.g. by Knoester and Van
der Windt (1987) and by Malcomson and Sartor (1987). An increase
in taxation would, according to this view, lead to claims for higher
gross wages by unions.
In highly unionized and small open economies, sueh as Belgium,
an expansion of the public sector could therefore harm the stability
of the economy if the resulting increase in taxation would be shifted
forward by unions into higher wages. The competitive position
would consequently deteriorate and unemployment would rise. A
tax-wage spiral would consequently develop and destabilize the eco-
nomy.
It is the purpose ofthis paper to incorporate tax shifting in a wage
bargaining framework. In addition to income taxes and sodal securi-
ty contributions paid by union members, a payroll tax will be intro-
duced as well. The resulting wage equation will be estimated simulta-
neously with a labour demand equation. The degree of tax shifting
will then show up in the parameter estimates of the model.
Since the emphasis of this paper lies on the tax shifting behaviour,
changes in the tax structure, e.g. through changes in the progressivity
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261of the income tax, will not be examined here. For a recent theoretica!
treatment of the latter, see Hersoug (1984).
The approach followed in this paper differs from the existing tax
push models by the explicit formulation of a wage bargaining set-up
which will be of the Nash type. The models referred to above, such
as the one estimated by Malcomson and Sartor (1987) do not allow
for wage bargaining. Instead, the union sets the wage level in a utility
maximizing way whereas the firm determines the level of employ-
ment on the labour demand function, given the wage chosen by the
union. This view on wage determination does not receive support
from the institutional labour economists who stress the bargaining
aspects in the wage determination process. An operational solution
derived from a set of plausible axioms is obtained with the Nash
bargaining model. This model has a strong appeal because of the
implied rational behaviour by the parties involved. It also allows for
the introduction of spedfic variables into the wage equation, such as
the payroll tax rate and profits which differentiate this approach
from the monopoly union case.
11. THE THEORETICAL MODEL
A. The Union
There are M identical workers in the economy which are either em-
ployed or unemployed. The preferences of an employed worker are
assumed to be represented by a quasi-concave utility function u
which has as arguments: the yearly real net of tax wage augmented
with real sodal security benefits other than unemployment compen-
sation and public goods G. The latter are represented by public in-
vestment. (See also Sampson (1983) for a similar treatment).
u = u (y, G) (1a)







the gross hourly wage,
the income tax rate, inclusive of sodal security
contributions,
sodal security benefits other than unemployment
compensation,
the consumer price index,(3)
h : hours worked per year,
y : real wage and transfer income,
G: public investment.
Note that social security benefits are far simplicity treated as
exempted from taxation. Furthermore, marginal utility of income
and of public goods is assumed positive and decreasing, i.e. uy > 0,
uyy < 0, uG > 0, uGG < 0. Complementarity between private
income and public goods implies uyG > 0, whereas substitutability
leads to uyG < 0.
Unemployed workers receive real unemployment benefits b which
are tax exempt. The utility function of an unemployed worker can
then be written as :
u (b, G) (2)
with ub > 0, Ubb < ° and u/bG ;;: 0.
The objective function U of the union is assumed to be of the
utilitarian form, i.e. it is a weighted average of the utility of the
employed and of the unemployed workers. The weights are respecti-
vely the probability of being employed and unemployed. This speci-
fication of the union objective function has been widely used in the
literature (see e.g. Oswald (1982), Van Rompuy and De Bruyne
(1980». It can also be interpreted as the expected utility of a repre-
sentative union member who does not know the probability of being
employed or not before a wage contract has been settled. Let total
employment in the private sector be denoted by Lp and public em-
ployment by Lg, then:
U = Lp + Lgu (y, G) + M - (Lp + Lg)u (b, G)
M M
Note that the weights in (3) are variabie since private employment
will depend on the wage cost to the firm. Public employment is assu-
med to be dependent on political decisions and is treated in an exoge-
nous way in the sequel.
The marginal utility to the union of a wage increase can be derived
from (3) and (Ia), assuming that hours are determined exogenously:
Uw = 1- { E Lp [u (y, G) - u (b, G] + (Lp+Lg) wy h (I-tl) (4)
M w Pc
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private employment. The first term in this expression contains the
utility differential between an employed and unemployed worker. It
corresponds to the utility loss (since E < 0) resulting from a wage
increase and a subsequent reduction in employment. The second
term refers to the utility gain of the employed workers. In the case
of a monopoly union, the wage would be chosen so as to maximize
(3). The optimal wage would therefore balance the marginal utility
gain and the marginal utility loss of a wage increase since, in order
to obtain an interior maximum Uw = O. It is obvious that as the
elasticity of private employment increases, the optimal wage will be
reduced. The optimal wage will be higher as the share of the wage
inelastic public employment in total employment increases.
B. The Firm
Private output X is produced in identical firms using private labour
Lp, imported materials and energy Zand the stock of capital K. The
latter is treated as exogenous whereas imported materials and energy
are bought at aprice Pz.
The profit maximizing level of employment can be written as:




where w is the yearly wage cost per worker:
w hw (1 +t2)
P
(6)
and: t2 = rate of employer's social security contributions,
P = price of output,
pz = price of imported materials and energy,
K = real stock of private capita!.
Note that the sign of PziP depends upon the complementarity
(negative) or substitutability (positive) relationship between Zand
LP.
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Wage contracts are negotiated between the union and the firm. In
the model outlined here, the wage rate w, i.e. the gross hourly wage
will be settled in the wage contract. It will furthermore apply to the
public sector as weU.
In the Nash solution, the optimal wage will result from the maxi-
mization of the foUowing product n:
n = (U - Up (1l" - 1r)'_I' (7)
The parameter 'Y denotes the bargaining strength of the union. If
'Y = 1, the bargaining solution reduces to a monopoly union solu-
tion. If on the other hand 'Y = 0, the resulting wage will maximize
profits. The reference or threat points U and 1r play a crucial role in
the Nash solution. They refer to the utility of the union and to the
firm's profits in case of disagreement.
As for the union, disagreement implies a strike and loss of wage
income. The utility function of the employed union member will
therefore reduce to:
u (q:c s, G) (8)
where q denotes strike compensation. The utility differential for the
union U - U can then be written, using (3) and (8)
U-U
where:
Lp ~ Lg [u(y, G) - u(y, G)] (9)
(10)
As for the firm, disagreement implies a production stop. In the
short run however, fixed costs F have to be borne. Denote profits by
7f:
7f = pX - (wLp + pzZ + F) (11)
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The profit differential reduces to :
1l" - 7f = pX - VC (12)
where VC are variabie costs.
Maximization of the Nash product n W.r.t. w, taking (9) and (12)
into account, leads to an implicit solution for the gross hourly wage
rate. An explicit specification for w which is consistent with the fra-
mework outlined here has the following form: [for further details
see Van Rompuy and De Bruyne (1988)].
w (h G Lp Lg ~ 1l" - 7f 1 + )
, 'M' M' 1 _ tI' Lp' t2, s, W - 1
? ? + + + +
The lagged wage is used here as a proxy for strike compensation on
which no time series data are available.
The expected signs are derived from an examination of the first
order condition for a maximum of the Nash product. The negative
sign for hours worked is based on the assumption that the income
effect in the demand for leisure dominates. Public employment will
affect wages in a positive sense since a rise in public employment will
increase the share of the wage inelastic employment.
The impact of private employment is not straightforward since
according to eq. (4), a larger share of private employment will incre-
ase utility loss of a wage increase. This negative impact may eventu-
ally dominate the positive income effect enjoined by the employed
workers.
Higher direct taxes (tl) and consumption prices are shifted for-
ward into higher wages according to the specification of the utility
function (1a). Profits per worker in the private sector have a positive
impact on wages whereas the payroll tax will be shifted backward
into lower wages. Social security benefits are a perfect substitute for
wage income and bear therefore a negative sign. The sign of the
public goods variabie will depend on the substitutability between pri-
vate income and public goods. Substitutability implies a negative
sign whereas complementarity leads to a positive impact. Finally, the
lagged wage as a proxy for strike compensation, has a positive im-
pact since an increase in the lagged wage will build a higher threshold
for future wage claims.
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The period covered by the data runs from 1961 to 1985. Most data
are drawn from the 'Maribel' databank organized by the Belgian
Planning Office. Imported intermediate goods and raw materials (Z)
and their price (pz) have been derived from trade statistics. The en-
dogenous wage and employment variables refer to the private sector
of the Belgian economy.
Table 1 contains a subsample of the tax rates ti and t2 as well as
the tax wedge from the observation period. The tax wedge is defined
as the difference between the yearly wage cost per worker and the
yearly net of tax wage, expressed as a percentage of the latter. Note
the sharp rise of the wedge from 1973 onward. The wedge increased
dramatically in the eighties as a consequence of (i) an increase in the
sodal security contributions and (ii) of the successive "indexation
jumps". Sodal security contributions paid by employees were up to
October 1982limited to a maximum amount and were in fact degres-
sive W.r.1. the wage bilI. From 1983 onward, sodal security contribu-
tions were calculated as a fixed percentage of the wage earnings and
were based on a proportional rate. The successive "indexation
jumps" resulted in an increase of the cost of labour to the firm
without a corresponding increase in the net of tax wage. This increa-
se in the cost of labour was interpreted as ~quivalent to an increase
in the payroll tax (t2). As a consequence, the payroll tax rate increa-
sed between 1982 and 1985 by 35 per cent as compared to an increase
of 12 per cent in the income tax rate (tl) inclusive of sodal security
contributions by workers.
TABLE 1
Tax Rates and the Tax Wedge
tI t2 Tax Wedge
1961 0.143281 0.158693 35,2 070
1964 0.152068 0.171312 38,1 070
1967 0.171293 0.189205 43,5070
1970 0.198885 0.203146 50,2070
1973 0.219421 0.219069 56,2070
1976 0.254279 0.222776 64,0070
1979 0.290345 0.221783 72,2070
1982 0.314315 0.205294 75,8070
1985 0.351798 0.276428 96,9070
Souree: Maribel, Planning Office.
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sists of the wage equation (11) and the private employment equation
(5) have been estimated by means of the full information maximum
likelihood method.
Table 2 contains the parameter estimates and the t-statistics. It
appears that all parameters with exception of the constant in the
employment equation are significantly different from zero and have
the expected sign in sofar as the latter could be predicted.
An increase in the share of public employment (Lg/M) willlead to
an increase in the nominal hourly wage (elasticity : 0.44). An increase
in thé share of private employment (LP/M) will have the same but
substantially larger effect (elasticity: 2.91).
An increase in the consumer price - income tax wedge (pCIl-tl ) will
be shifted forward into higher wages (elasticity: 0.69). An increase in
the nominal profit differential per worker (71" - 7f/LP) in the private
sector will also push up wages (elasticity : 0.27). On the other hand,
an increase in the payroll tax will be shifted backward into lower
wages (elasticity: -2.30). It also appears that social benefits are con-
sidered as substitutes for wages since their elasticity is negative (-
0.28). Public goods are, judging from the positive elasticity (0.10)
complements to private income.
As for the employment equation, the product wage elasticity (-
0.32) points to an inelastic demand for labour in the short run. One
would conclude from the low and negative elasticity (-0.14) of em-
ployment with respect to the relative price of imported materials and
energy (pz/p) that labour and materials are weak complements.
Since this paper focuses on tax shifting, it is necessary to look
closer at the tax elasticities of the wage rate. The elasticity of the
wage rate with respect to the income tax rate, incIusive of social
security contributions by workers, evaluated at sample means
amounts to 0.21. This means that a 10 per cent increase in the rate
ti will be shifted forward into a 2.1 per cent increase in the hourly
wage. This wage impact will in the short run lead to a decrease in
private employment by 0.68 per cent.
The elasticity of the wage with respect to the payroll tax rate (t2)
evaluated at sample means is estimated to be -0.39. This implies that
aiO per cent increase in the payroll tax rate williead to a 3.9 per cent
decrease in the hourly wage. The wage cost will however increase by
6.1 per cent which will in the short run resuIt in a decrease of private




Variabie Parameter estimate t-statistics
constant 3.503 5.49
Inh -1.142 -4.63
In Lg/M 0.442 2.85
In Lp/M 2.912 10.41
In Pc/(l-t,) 0.690 4.19
In ('1l" - 1i')/Lp) 0.275 3.95
In (l+t2) -2.300 -5.98
In w - , 0.601 5.90
In s -0.282 -3.19
In G 0.097 3.79
Standard error ofthe regression = 0.017
Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.805
Employment equation: Lp
Variabie Parameter estimate t-statistic
constant -1.546 -1.70
In K 0.277 3.43
In pz/P -0.141 -2.44
In wip -0.322 -3.96
In LP - I 0.941 10.83
Standard error ofthe regression = 0.011
Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.408
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper is a first attempt to analyse the process of tax shifting
within an explicit wage bargaining model. The empirical evidence
confirms the central role played by varioustaxes in the determina-
tion of wages. Increases in the income tax rate or in the social securi-
ty contributions paid by employees are partially shifted forward into
higher wages. Furthermore, the empirical results point to a partial
backward shifting of higher payroll taxes. In both cases, the wage
cost increases with a detrimental effect on employment, ceteris pari-
bus.
These findings disclose a particular view on the causes of the poor
Belgian macroeconomic performance from the mid seventies to the
beginning of the eighties. A scenario of rising wage gaps and unem-
ployment, low growth, a worsening of the current account and
269mounting government deficits can indeed be the result of increased
government expenditures which were partially financed through hig-
her taxes on labour. Such a policy leads to higher wage costs, lower
employment, a deterioration of profitability which negatively influ-
ences investment and growth, reduced international competitiveness
affecting the export performance of the economy, and increased go-
vernment deficits. This kind of self-inflicted stagnation has been do-
cumented by Knoester (1983) for some countries.
Clearly, the model as it stands cannot track all ofthese channels. We
intend to enlarge and refine the model so that it can take into ac-
count the effects on capacity, on the current account and on the
public sector deficit. Moreover, the analysis will be enriched if the
assumption of perfect competition in the output market is abando-
ned in favour of price-setting firms operating in a market of mono-
polistic competition.
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